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CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND DISCRIMINATION:

SAMOANS BEFORE A PUBLIC HOUSING EVICTION BOARD*
RICHARD LEMPERT KARL MONSMA
University of Michigan Northwestern University

In Hawaii Samoans are a stigmatized ethnic group. We examine how this group is
treated by a public housing eviction board. Statistical analysis suggests Samoans are

discriminated against in financial cases. Interviews indicate, however, that Samoans
are disadvantaged largely because their excuses are not persuasive and would not be
regardless of the ethnicity of the tenants making them. In this sense Samoans are
treated "like any other tenant," and illegal discrimination, as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment, has not occurred. But Samoans make unpersuasive excuses more

often than other tenants because excuses that are reasonable in the context of Samoan culture do not seem reasonable to judges from a different culture. Thus among
tenants behind in their rent, Samoans fare worse than do non-Samoans, much as they
might fare if board members held anti-Samoan prejudices. We call this implication of
cultural hegemony "cultural discrimination" and note the dilemmas it poses, not the
least of which is that it makes problematic the very concept of discrimination.

In the 1971 case, Griggs v Duke Power
(401 U.S. 424), the United States Su-

net. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, dis-

crimination ordinarily requires evidence of

preme Court held that if an employment test

unequal treatment and not just a disparate

(or other mechanism for screening job appli-

impact; when the Griggs case was decided

cants) had a disparate impact on a group pro-

Title VII could have been interpreted in the

tected by Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of

same way.

1964, discrimination in violation of the Act

What the Griggs test does not recognize is

would be presumed unless the employer

that the very concept of discrimination is

contestable.
could prove the "job-relatedness" of the
test. In assuming that job-relatedness
(For details on the Griggs case, see England

negates the discriminatory implications of

1992 chap. 5.) The Griggs case represents a

proven disparate impacts, the Court ignores

high-water mark in the Supreme Court's ju-

the possibility that accepted criteria of job

risprudence of discrimination, for it estab-

performance (e.g., punctuality) in themselves

lishes proof rules that can catch both inten-

may privilege the performance standards of

tional and inadvertent discriminators in their

one social group vis-a-vis another and may

* Direct correspondence to either author with a

dominant group's understanding of proper

copy to the other. This research was supported by
the Law and Social Science Section of the National Science Foundation (SES-8617981) and by
the Cook and Cohn Funds of the University of
Michigan Law School. The cooperation of the

endure precisely because they embody a
behavior. It is not clear that in Griggs the
Justices perceived this issue; but if they did,
one can sympathize with their reluctance to

address it. For when one enters this realm,

Hawaii Housing Authority was essential, and we

which we call cultural discrimination, the

thank the many people associated with the HHA

concept of discrimination becomes problematic, as discrimination can be situated as

who facilitated this investigation. We also thank
Paul Burstein, Rosemary Gartner, Christopher
Jencks, Deborah Malamud, Jeff Paige, and the
ASR Editor for their comments on earlier versions
of this paper. All findings and opinions expressed
in this paper are the authors' and should not be

much in perspectives on behavior and outcomes as in behavior and outcomes them-

selves. For this reason the concept "discrimination" has long been contested political ter-

attributed to the National Science Foundation, the

ritory, even if in most debates about discrimi-

University of Michigan Law School, or the Hawaii Housing Authority.

diously ignore this fact.

nation, the courts and other participants stu-
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nored in studies of discrimination in legal

We illustrate these points and elucidate the
concept of cultural discrimination by exam-

value certain behaviors and devalue others,

decision-making. Decision-makers may

ining the decisions made by an informal tribunal-the Hawaii Housing Authority's
(HHA) eviction board. We begin our search
for discrimination in a conventional way by
developing a model using measurable variables that might be expected to influence
board decision-making, regardless of a defendant's identity. We include in our model a
dummy variable that captures membership in
the group that is the hypothesized target of

regardless of the ethnic identity of the person exhibiting them. But the decision-makers' values may reflect their cultural roots,
and they may fail to respect or even to recognize the ways the behavior of others is

part of a different cultural value system. For
example, a state legislature may make it illegal for parents to withdraw children from
school before age 16, and the state's judges

may punish Amish parents who violate the
law in the same way they would punish non-

discrimination (in our case, Samoans). A significant coefficient on the dummy variable is

Amish parents. Not only does this law and

conventionally taken as evidence of discrimination; if the coefficient is small and not significant, convention suggests that we do not

why Amish beliefs counsel against school-

have a discriminatory process.

recognize that schooling until at least age 16

This approach treats discrimination as a
residual category. To use ethnic discrimination as an example, if a significant bivariate
relationship exists between ethnicity and the
likelihood of an adverse outcome, the conventional approach does not conclude that
discrimination exists unless the relationship
persists when other factors that might affect
outcomes regardless of ethnicity are also
taken into account. When, however, ethnicity adds significantly to the ability of other
variables to predict adverse outcomes, we regard that as evidence of ethnic discrimination. The more adequately we have accounted for other variables that might have
affected the outcome, the more certain we
are that such discrimination has occurred.
This conventional approach does not, how-

came to seem "natural" to the state's citi-

ever, allow one to trace out all the disadvantaging implications of ethnicity, no matter
how adequately other variables that might
influence the decision-maker are identified
and measured. First, there is the familiar
problem of institutional discrimination. A
sentencing judge, for example, may weigh a
defendant's prior arrests the same, regardless
of the ethnicity of the defendant. However,
discriminatory decisions by police or complainants may result in more frequent or
more serious prior arrests for the typical minority defendant than for the typical White
defendant.

Second, there is what we call "cultural
discrimination," a phenomenon typically ig-

its enforcement fail to respect the reasons
ing past the eighth grade (Wisconsin v

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 [1972]), it also fails to

zens only when urbanization and the mechanization of agriculture reduced the value of
child labor relative to that of more educated

adults. Thus both the makers and enforcers
of compulsory schooling laws have acted
without considering that, if agricultural
production statewide were technologically

similar to that of the Amish, withdrawing
children from school at age 14 might seem
"natural."

While the legal system provides ready examples of cultural discrimination (Post

1988), the phenomenon is not limited to legal decision-makers. For example, Bourdieu,
in a jointly-authored essay that prefigures his
conception of cultural capital, identifies a
similar phenomenon, which he calls "class
racism," at work in the French educational
system (Bourdieu and Passeron 1979; Lamont and Lareau 1988). What concerns
Bourdieu is the disadvantages students from
a particular social class (the petty bourgeoisie) suffer through the universalistic application of the apparently legitimate criteria of
educated.elites. For us, it is members of a
particular ethnic group who, in comparison
to others from the same social class, are disadvantaged by the application of apparently
legitimate criteria in a universalistic fashion.
In both cases the "legitimate criteria" reflect
cultural understandings shared by the judges
but not by all of those judged. In Bourdieu's
example, cultural understandings follow
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class boundaries; in ours, they follow ethnic
ones.
Cultural discrimination has been most

readily identified in education. Various au-

thors have discussed how language and other
culturally acquired characteristics children
bring to school can affect their treatment, and
ultimately their success, in educational institutions (Erickson and Mohatt 1982; Labov
1972; Lareau 1989; Philips 1983). Cicourel
and Mehan (1983), summarizing much of
this literature, write:
Children from different cultural or class backgrounds often do not present themselves in
ways that school personnel interpret as match-

ing an existing routine educational frame or
format. While children's behavior at home and
school conforms to cultural patterns and is consistent, educators do not often recognize the
cognitive and linguistic capabilities and skills
in children's performances unless carefully instructed to do so. (P. 12, emphasis added)

We illustrate the implications of culture for
outcomes in a different setting-an informal

model of discrimination to determine if the
group we examine-Samoans-appears to
be disadvantaged, net of other variables.
Turning next to qualitative data, we then ask
whether discrimination suggested by our
quantitative model is based on arguably legitimate responses to cultural characteristics.
This reverses the usual perspective of cultural discrimination studies, which argue or
imply that distinctions based on apparently
legitimate factors are in fact illegitimate responses to cultural differences. By reversing

this perspective, our argument makes problematic the very meaning of discrimination
and, by implication, calls into question the
adequacy of the long-standing practice of using archival data and quantitative models
alone to spot legal discrimination.
Finally much of the research on cultural
disadvantages in school deals with such char-

acteristics as accents, abilities brought to the
classroom, game-playing patterns, and the

be conventionally categorized as lower class.

like. These are noncognitive factors-students unthinkingly bring such disadvantaging characteristics with them-and members
of the dominant culture are ordinarily unaware that such culturally conditioned characteristics elicit their negative responses.'
However the cultural behavior we examine,
excuse making, is cognitive. Our subjects do
think about what excuses to give and attempt
to construct excuses that will be accepted.
Judges responding to these excuses similarly
consider-and indeed discuss-the validity
of the excuses they hear. Thus, our example
shows how cultural understandings can limit

This allows us to avoid culture-class confu-

even conscious cognitive efforts to behave in

sion, because variation among our subjects
cannot be due to class differences.

can lead to considered decisions that reject

legal tribunal-and add to the existing litera-

ture, not only by emphasizing the problematic and political nature of what counts as

discrimination, but also in other important
ways.

First, as the quote from Cicourel and

Mehan suggests, in most studies that show
people are disadvantaged because of cultural
traits, class is confounded with culture. Our
study, however, deals only with low-income
public housing tenants, all of whom would

ways acceptable to a dominant culture and

Second, research on cultural discrimination typically involves qualitative assessments that might conflict with the picture
presented by quantitative approaches. For

1 This is also true in the few sociological studies that focus on the legal implications of what we
call cultural discrimination. Thus, Holstein (1987)

example, Philips (1983) found that for cultural reasons Warm Springs Indians performed poorly in competitive classroom con-

shows how taken-for-granted conceptions of gender-appropriate behavior mean that "what may be
considered mentally healthy for a man might be

texts. A traditional quantitative analysis
would not, however, have indicated that the

diagnosed as pathologicalfor a woman and vice
versa" (p. 145). And Maynard (1984), in his study
of the discourse organization of plea bargaining,
suggests that biases leading to unequal treatment

Indian children were discriminated against,
because the children would have scored
poorly on standardized cognitive tests, sup-

posedly legitimate measures, used to explain
classroom performance. In contrast, we begin by estimating a traditional quantitative

may reside in the typifications inherent in the discourse constituting the bargaining process. Bennett and Feldman's (1981) conclusions are similar to Maynard's, but their focus is on how stories
are told and received in jury trials.
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another's cultural motivations, even while

HHA's charges were admitted. In three-quar-

recognizing and on occasion appreciating

ters of the cases, the charge was nonpayment
of rent, and the fact of nonpayment was al-

them.

In examining how Samoans fare before the

most always indisputable; but even when

HHA's eviction board, we are observing an

some other lease violation was charged, like

unfamiliar minority group before an unusual

fighting or keeping pets, the tenant usually

court. This situation, in fact, enhances our
ability to identify and explore nuances of
cultural discrimination, and what we learn
contains important general lessons. The dif-

it. Ordinarily, after the tenant presented explanations, promises, or excuses, board mem-

ferent layers we peel away in our search for

discrimination caution against too readily accepting the conclusions of studies limited to

admitted the violation and made excuses for

bers, the HHA's prosecutor, and occasionally
the project manager questioned the tenant.
Throughout, the tone was informal, and there

was considerable effort to ensure that the ten-

data that are less rich. Moreover, cultural dis-

ant understood what was being said. The typi-

crimination of the sort we identify is also
likely to exist in other situations where mem-

cal hearing took between 20 and 30 minutes,
which is generous when compared to the typi-

bers of one class or status group pass judgment on members of another. Bourdieu and

cal hearings in some small claims courts and
misdemeanor trial courts.

Passeron (1979), as we have noted, suggest

Over time, while the informality of the

that a similar phenomenon related academic
success to social class in French higher edu-

basic hearing remained more or less the

cation during the early 1960s, Post (1988)
sees something like this at work in nine-

same, other features of the eviction process
and the board's decision-making process
changed. (Changes are described in detail in

teenth- and twentieth-century reinterpreta-

Lempert [1989]). For example, the HHA's

tions of the English common law of blasphemy, and Bennett and Feldman (1981) report that criminal defendants may be disbe-

prosecutors changed, with lawyers eventu-

lieved when jurors don't share the cultural
understandings embedded in the stories they
tell.

DATA AND SUBJECTS

The Research Setting
We examine the legal decisions of the Ha-

ally taking over this role from HHA staff officials, and the board at one point was divided into two panels to allow more frequent meetings. The "Period" variable in the
models we present is designed to capture
significant differences over time in board
procedures and the environment in which
the board operated.
Our data are drawn from the HHA's files
on all eviction actions from 1966 to 1985.
These records include information on the

waii Housing Authority's (HHA) eviction

hearings and their outcomes, appeals and

board from 1966 through 1985. This board

their outcomes, the amount of rent owed, and
a number of other possibly relevant variables, such as family composition, the age

consisted of a group of citizen-volunteers
whose assent was required for the HHA to

evict a tenant. Previously, we have described
this board, the HHA's eviction process, and

and marital status of family members,
whether a family was receiving welfare, le-

the way the board and eviction process has

gal representation, family income, and the

changed over time (Lempert 1989; Lempert

occurrence of various kinds of trouble, such
as illness or unemployment.
Only some of the HHA's eviction files in-

and Monsma 1988; Monsma and Lempert
1992). Here we mention only those details
important to understanding this study.
Throughout the years 1966 to 1985, procedures before the eviction board were infor-

mal. Tenants usually appeared without lawyers. The HHA's case was briefly presented,
usually by questioning the housing project

manager, and the tenant could respond however he or she wanted. Almost always the

cluded information on ethnicity. Where this
information was missing, we coded ethnicity
into two categories, Samoan or non-Samoan,
based on first and last names. Married couples were coded as Samoan if either partner
had a Samoan first or last name. The coding
was done by a sociology graduate student
native to Hawaii and conversant with island
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culture. Since Samoan names are usually dis-

These interviews complement our file data

tinctive, we have confidence in this coding.2

with information about the observations and

In addition to the data collected from the

attitudes of those who, apart from the ten-

HHA's files, in 1987 we conducted semi-

ants, figured most prominently in the evic-

structured interviews, usually lasting 30 to

tion process. In addition we attended and either recorded or took detailed notes on all

90 minutes, with the HHA's prosecutors,

board members, and others who had been
connected with the eviction process from

eviction board hearings held during the summers of 1969 and 1987. In short, unlike most

1966 on. This group includes the four

quantitative studies, we have detailed quali-

people who prosecuted most of the cases in
our sample, almost all eviction board members (including every chairperson), all the
current housing project managers and many
former ones, staff supervisors (including
current and past Executive Directors), the

tative information on the process we seek to
model and can identify potentially important
variables that could not be quantitatively

two legal aid paralegals who most often ap-

operationalized. And unlike most qualitative
studies of discrimination, we can determine
quantitatively whether the disadvantaged
group we focus on fares worse than other

peared in eviction actions, and private and
legal aid lawyers who served on occasion as

portant relevant variables.

groups after controlling statistically for im-

defense counsel. The majority of those interviewed were not Caucasian, although
Caucasians and people of Japanese ancestry
were the most frequently represented ethnic

About Samoans in Hawaii
Although our data only allow us to investi-

Hawaiian, Filipino, Korean, Samoan, or

gate discrimination against Samoans, we expected that if any group were discriminated

mixed heritages. The board members were

against in the eviction process it would be

citizen-volunteers from a variety of back-

board members had employment back-

the Samoans. In part we expected this because our interviewees often spontaneously
described problems with Samoans. Only
three other ethnic groups were similarly
mentioned (Laotians, Vietnamese, and

grounds in real estate management, and

Tongans). Not only were there far more men-

throughout most of the period of our study
at least one board member had a social work

tions of Samoans than of other groups, but
when members of other groups were mentioned as troublemakers, the trouble often involved difficulties with Samoans.
More importantly, we thought Samoans
were the likeliest victims of discrimination

groups. Other interviewees were of Chinese,

grounds. Apart from the two public housing

tenants on each panel, most were from the
middle class. During the 1980s several

background. Over 80 percent of the eviction
board member interviews and three of the

four HHA prosecutor interviews were conducted in person. As the time remaining for
field work grew short and the information
new interviews yielded grew redundant, we
conducted a higher percentage of interviews

by telephone. Whether done in person or by
phone, the interviews, with only a few ex-

ceptions, were tape recorded, and transcripts

because Samoans in Hawaii are a particularly
disadvantaged group. Their per capita income is the lowest of any ethnic group in
Hawaii for which separate statistics are kept,
(Kincaid and Yum 1987; U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights 1979). More than half of the

The quotations we cite come from these

Samoan adults in Hawaii have nine years of
school or less (Baker 1986). Unemployment

transcripts.

rates for Samoans are high (Hect, Orans, and

were sent to interviewees for correction.

2 Typical Samoan first names are Leulusoo,
Fuifatu, and Faaula; typical last names are
Faletago, Fauolo, and Leatutufu. Coding by name
catches most tenants of mixed Samoan ancestry,
but excludes a few. We do not believe this causes
systematic biases, but it will cause random error
that is likely to dampen any effect we find.

Janes 1986). A disproportionate number of
Hawaii's Samoans are in prison (Howard
1986), and Samoans in Hawaii are generally
regarded as a violent and dangerous people
(Howard 1986; Hect et.al. 1986). Indeed,
even among California's Samoan immigrants, it is recognized that "Samoans in Hawaii are stigmatized" (Janes 1990). This
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view is confirmed in a study of the opinions

Table 1. Percentage Distribution of Reason for Sub-

held of each other by five Hawaiian ethnic

poena among Samoans and Other Ethnic
Groups: 1966 to 1985

groups (Caucasians, Japanese Americans,

and immigrant-generation Filipinos, Vietnamese, and Samoans). Using semantic dif-

ferentials, all respondents except Samoans,
ranked Samoans at the bottom when moral
traits such as "industriousness" were evaluated. And except for the Samoans, whose av-

erage ranking by other groups on the six

Percentage Percentage
Among Among Other
Reason for Subpoena Samoans Ethnic Groups

Falsification, fraud 10.3 8.3
Nonpayment of rent 78.5 72.6
Guests
Pets

3.8

1.9

4.2
6.2

measured dimensions was close to neutral,
the other four Hawaiian ethnic groups had

Other

generally positive stereotypes of each other,

Total percent 99.9 100.0

(Yum and Wang 1983).

Overall Samoans account for about 21 percent of both the eviction actions the HHA

commenced by subpoena and the cases in
which hearings were held.3 Because we have
no information on the ethnic composition of

the HHA's housing projects, we cannot say

trouble

5.4

8.7

Number of cases 261 1,000

Note: X2 = 12.08, d.f. = 4

and the tenant's defense was often that he or
she didn't understand that certain income had
to be reported.

whether Samoans are disproportionately rep-

The proportion of subpoenas issued for
nonpayment of rent may be slightly higher
tions involving Samoans is, however, far
among Samoans than among other ethnic
higher after 1982 than before. This may regroups because Samoans in the United States
flect an increase in the proportion of Samoan
often face demands for money which they
tenants, but the bulk of the upsurge is probfeel they cannot deny. Samoan families that
ably due to the increased efficiency with
help members emigrate to the United States
which the HHA processed nonpayment
often expect regular cash payments in return
cases. For cultural reasons we later discuss,
(Holmes 1974), and all Samoan families exwe believe that Samoans are more likely than
pect that even distant members will contribother tenants to have family or church netute cash toward special occasions, such as
works they can draw on for financial support, funerals and weddings (Ablon 1970, 1971).
but they need time to mobilize aid.
Churches, too, expect regular financial contributions, and churches are especially important institutions for many Samoan immiReasons for Eviction
grants. Thus Samoans are more likely than
Samoans charged with violating HHA rules
tenants from other ethnic groups to experiwere somewhat more likely than other tenence strong social pressures to spend their
ants to be subpoenaed for fraud or nonpayrent money for other purposes. Alternatively,
ment of rent and less likely to be subpoenaed
the high proportion of financial cases among
for pet violations and other kinds of troubleSamoans may simply reflect the fact that they
some behavior (see Table 1). The ethnic difare less likely than other tenants to engage in
ference in subpoenas for fraud may occur
nonfinancial troublesome behavior. This may
because many Samoan tenants spoke English
be true in the case of pets, since Samoans selpoorly or not at all. Fraud usually involved
dom keep dogs, but if project managers and
accusations of concealing family income,
tenant board members can be believed, it is
resented in these data. The proportion of ac-

almost certainly not true of fighting, noisemaking, and similar offenses. Perhaps the
moved out on receiving a subpoena or because
underrepresentation of Samoans in such cases
the problem was resolved without a hearing and
is because Samoans are reluctant to complain
the HHA cancelled the action. Of 1,268 cases
about each other or because non-Samoans are
commenced by subpoena over the two decades of
our study, 1,007 led to a board hearing. In 7 cases intimidated into keeping quiet.
The high proportion of Samoans subpoewe are missing information on reason for subnaed for nonpayment of rent or for fraud is
peona.
3 Hearings might not be held because a tenant
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Table 2. Names and Definitions of Variables
Variable Name Definition

Outcome Coded 1 if tenant was evicted; 0 if tenant was allowed to stay. (Cases in which a tenant
was technically evicted but enforcement of order was immediately stayed were coded 0.)
Period Time period. The years 1969 through 1985 are divided into 6 time periods to control for
changes in the HHA eviction board's decision-making procedures: 1 = 1969-1974, 2 =
1975-1977, 3 = 1978-Oct. 1979, 4 = Oct. 1979-Jan. 1982, 5 = Jan. 1982-Feb. 1984, 6 =
Feb. 1984-Dec. 1985.
Case Characteristics

Reason Reason for subpoena: 1 = falsification, fraud or miscellaneous (generally technical), 2 =

nonpayment, 3 = guests, 4 = pets, 5 = other trouble behavior.
Rent owed Natural log of constant 1982-1984 dollars owed at the time of the subpoena.
Percent repaid Percentage of rent debt at time of subpoena paid before the hearing.
History of Tenant-Authority Interaction

Appearance # Number of eviction actions brought against tenant, including the current appearance.

Rent often Substantial rent delinquency: Coded 1 if tenant has more than 2 years of rent delinquency

delinquent history, 0 otherwise.
Tenant Characteristics

Children Number of children living with tenant.

Income valid Coded 1 if family income information is not missing; 0 if missing.
Income Natural log of family income (in constant 1982-1984 dollarsa); coded 0 if missing.
Financial problems Financial problem index. Number of financial problems in family: Occurrence of unem-

ployment, substantial debt, illness, or garnished wages each adds 1 point to index.
Samoan Coded 1 if family is all or part Samoan, 0 otherwise.
a Constant dollars were set to the average dollar value for the three-year period.

not explained by changes over time in the
HHA's eviction process. The percentage of
cases brought for financial reasons is higher
among Samoans than among non-Samoans in

are defined in Table 2. Several of these vari-

ables were not coded for cases before 1969
and were coded for only a random sample of

all time periods we use to distinguish important changes in the eviction process.

other studies measure strength of evidence imper-

EVIDENCE FOR DISCRIMINATION

most other studies have only approximate and of-

fectly or not at all. In our study the Authority's
case is almost always incontrovertible, so

strength of evidence is not a variable. Second,

Quantitative Evidence From HHA Records

ten erratic measures of the seriousness of the offense. We measure seriousness by an accurate,

As a first step in determining whether Samo-

continuous measure, the log of the amount of
money owed. Finally, most other studies depend

ans suffer discrimination in HHA eviction
board hearings, we present a series of probit
models. Variables indicating case characteristics, tenant characteristics, and aspects of

the tenant's relationship with the Authority
over time serve as controls.4 These variables
4 Although we argue later that a crucial variable ("excuse quality") is missing from our
model, compared to most quantitative models
probing discrimination by courts, our model, as
applied to the financial problem cases we focus
on, appears particularly well specified. First, most

for their control variables (e.g., employment, past

record, etc.) on information collected in conjunction with the problem that led to the adjudication,
when persons involved may have incentives to

deceive. Most of our information on control variables, such as employment history, past viola-

tions, family composition, and the like, comes

from records that were generated at annual income reviews or in other settings unconnected to

the adjudication. The same is true of other variables (such as welfare status) which we examined
but excluded from our final model because their
effects were weak and not statistically significant.
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cases for the years 1979 through 1985.5 We

Table 3. Probit Model Predicting Outcome at HHA

have used the smaller set of variables with

Eviction Hearings for Samoans and Other

more complete information for this analysis.

Ethnic Groups: Cases Subpoenaed for Reasons Other Than Nonpayment or Fraud, 1969

In all models the data are weighted to reflect

to 1985

the composition of all cases for the years
1969 through 1985.6 We analyze these data
separately for financial violation cases and
for other cases.
Table 3 presents a probit model for the

Independent Variables Coefficient

Constant

.0653
(.139)

chance of eviction in cases brought for reasons other than nonpayment or fraud. The

small and nonsignificant coefficient for the

Samoan dummy variable in this model provides little evidence of discrimination.
Table 4 presents probit models for the like-

Period

1-3 (1969-Oct. 1979)a -.497
(-1.244)

4 (Oct. 1979-Jan. 1982) -.0421
(-.108)

lihood of eviction in financial violation
cases. In addition to the control variables

5 (Jan. 1982-Feb. 1984) -.488
(-1.222)

used for the model in Table 3, Table 4 in-

cludes variables, such as the amount of
money owed, that are relevant only for financial violation cases. The coefficient for the

Samoan variable in Model 1 is positive and
statistically significant, indicating that, con-

trolling for other variables in the equation,
Samoans were more likely than non-Samo-

Case Characteristics

Reason for subpoena:
Guests

-.298
(-1.045)

Pets

-.334
(-1.148)

ans to be evicted. The estimated Samoan effect is strong enough to make a substantial
difference in a family's chances of eviction.
For a case that has, based on the control variables, an estimated probability of eviction

equal to the overall (weighted) average of

.326, being Samoan increases the estimated
probability of eviction to .473.

Tenant-Authority History

Appearance

#

.433
(-1.791)

Tenant Characteristics

Children

-.0601
(-.873)

The degree of discrimination against Sa-

moans may have changed over time. Model 2
includes terms for the interaction of Samoan

Financial problems -.258

and period. The three interaction coefficients
are contrasts between the Samoan effect dur-

Periods

ing the period in question and the Samoan
effect during the last period. The estimated
5 When the total caseload in a year was 100 or

(-.855)

1-3

x

-.319

Financial problems (-.655)
Samoan

.0968

(.299)

less, all cases were coded on all variables. In

Likelihood ratio X2 14.41

years when the caseload was more than 100, a
random sample of 100 cases were coded on all

Degrees of freedom 10

variables, and all cases were coded on a subset of
these variables. For a detailed discussion of how
we built our models, see Monsma and Lempert
(1992).

6 The weight variable varies across years and
has a higher value for years in which the sample

is a lower proportion of the total caseload for that

*p < .05 (two-tailed tests)

a Periods 1 to 3 are combined in this model because
there are not enough cases in these periods taken separately to yield stable estimates.
Notes: N = 142. Cases are weighted. Outcome coded

1 if tenant was evicted, 0 otherwise. T-ratios are in payear. It is equal to (Ni/ni) x (n/N), where N is the

population size, n is the sample size, and N1 and

rentheses. Omitted categories of "Period" and "Reason

subpeona" are "Period 6" (Feb. 1984-Dec. 1985)
ni are the population and sample sizes for a for
par-

ticular year.

and "Other trouble behavior."
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Table 4. Probit Models Predicting Outcome at HHA Eviction Hearings for Samoans and Other Ethnic Groups:

Nonpayment and Fraud Cases, 1969 to 1985
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant

-3.009* -3.045* -2.645 *
(-4.306) (-4.328) (-3,711)

Period

1(1969-1974)
2

-1.529* -1.450* -1.590*
(-3.913) (-3.513) (-4.012)

(1975-1977)

-.372

(-1.041)

3

4

(1978-Oct.

(Oct.

-.299
(-.788)

-.380
(-1.062)

1979) -.543 -.451 -.557
(-1.725) (-1.296) (-1.772)

1979-Jan.1982)

-.263

(-1.380)

-.188

(-.839)

-.264

(-1.383)

5 (Jan. 1982-Feb. 1984) -.697* -.669* -.703*
(-3.925)

(-2.905)

(-3.924)

Case Characteristics

Falsification,

fraud

2.813*

(4.237)

Rent

owed

.460*

(5.010)

2.795*

(4.202)

2.808*

(4.226)

.457*

.413*

(4.948)

(4.401)

Falsification, fraud x Rent owed -.368* -.365* -.374*
(-3.514) (-3.474) (-3.560)

Percent

repaid

-.0115*

(-6.476)

-.0113*

(-6.334)

-.0116*

(-6.508)

Tenant-Authority History

Appearance#

.415*

(3.461)

Rent

often

delinquent

.412*

(3.439)

.436*

(2.493)

.392*
(3.248)

.428*

(2.430)

.459*

(2.613)

Tenant Characteristics

Children

-.0877*

-.0856*

(-2.091)
Income
Income

valid

valid

x

(-1.827)

4.821* 4.859*
(4.178) (4.203)

4.905*
(4.225)

Income

-.513*

(-4.203)
Financial

-.0773

(-2.034)

-.516*

(-4.226)

-.530*

(-4.309)

problems -.0827 -.0862 -.0809
(-.853) (-.887) (-.827)

Periods 1-3 x Financial problems -.612* -.623* -.591*
(-2.549)

Samoan
Periods

1-3

Period

4

Period

5

x

x

(-2.559)

(-2.455)

.381*
.496
-1.081
(2.602) (1.690) (-1.506)
x

Samoan

Samoan

Samoan

-.361
(-.562)
-.354
(-.759)

-.0626

(-.175)
Samoan

x

Rent

owed

.242*
(2.093)

Likelihood ratio X2 183.82* 184.67* 188.59*
Degrees

of

freedom

17

20

18

*p < .05 (two-tailed tests)
Notes: N = 620. Cases are weighted. Outcome coded I if tenant was evicted; 0 otherwise. T-ratios are in
parentheses. Omitted categories of "Period" and "Reason for subpeona" are "Period 6" (Feb. 1984-Dec. 1985)
and "Nonpayment of rent."
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Samoan effects increase across periods, but
whether taken individually or jointly, the interaction terms are nonsignificant (for the
joint test of significance x2 = .85; d.f. = 3).
One form of discrimination is to weigh

From this quantitative analysis it appears
that Samoans accused of financial violations
fare worse in the eviction process than similarly situated non-Samoans. We may call this

interaction of the Samoan dummy variable

Samoan disadvantage "discrimination," but
we should be aware of precisely what this
means: Samoans threatened with eviction
have a somewhat worse chance of remaining
in project housing than tenants from other
ethnic groups who are like them on the con-

and the natural log of the amount owed at the

trol variables.

evidence suggesting a serious violation more
heavily when the defendant is a Samoan.
This appears to happen when rent is owed.
Model 3 in Table 4 includes a term for the

time of the subpoena (in constant dollars).
The estimated coefficient is positive and is
more than twice its standard error, indicating
that for each unit increase in the amount

Qualitative Evidence From Interviews

Checks for interaction between the Samoan

An obvious reason why our results suggest
discrimination is that it occurs; that is, that
board decisions are motivated by prejudice
against Samoans. Samoans are socioeconomically the least advantaged of the various ethnic groups that populate Hawaii and
are apparently stigmatized on this account. In
deciding whether to evict, the board mem-

variable and other variables indicating case
severity (percent rent repaid, rent delinquency history, appearance number) show no

bers may be biased against Samoans, or the
HHA's prosecutor or manager-complainants
may push harder for eviction when Samoans

significant interaction.8

are involved. Interviews with prosecutors,
project managers, and board members indicate that some do hold negative stereotypes

owed the chances of eviction for Samoans
increase by more than they do for other ten-

ants.7 This interaction is consistent with evidence we present later, which shows that the

board is unwilling to accept the kinds of excuses that Samoans often give for high debts.

7 The negative coefficient on the Samoan variable in Model 3 should not be taken to mean that,
net of the interaction effect, there is a benefit to
being Samoan. It should be instead seen as an ad-

of Samoans.

For example, one prosecutor, talking generally about cases in which inoperative ve-

justment to the intercept due to the strong interhicles had been parked in project lots, said
action of Samoan ethnicity and the amount of rent
he would tell the owner of such a car:
owed. There are only six Samoan cases in the
rent-owed range (less than about $86) where this
I don't care if it is up on blocks and you are
variable suggests Samoans would be treated more
going to have to have 50 Samoans come out
leniently, so the negative coefficient is mainly
and help you carry it away-two weeks from
due to extrapolation from cases with higher debts,
now the car is gone, or it is there, and that is
where Samoans in fact fare worse. Moreover, five
what decides whether you are going to stay or
of the six Samoan cases within this range were
not stay.
fraud cases in which nothing was owed at the
time of subpoena. In these cases Samoans may in
It is instructive that the prosecutor assumed
fact fare better than non-Samoans, not because of
that Samoans would be involved and that the
bias in their favor, but because they can make
credible claims that they failed to report informa-solution might involve Samoan manual labor.
One board chairperson conveyed his image
tion accurately because of their difficulties in unof Samoans in apologizing for the fact that a
derstanding English.

8 We also analyzed some 100 cases involving
financial problems that were appealed to the
HHA's Board of Commissioners during the period we studied. The commissioners are ultimately responsible for everything the HHA does.
For most of the period we studied they held informal hearings for tenants who filed appeals and
had discretion to allow tenants whose eviction
had been ordered by the eviction board to stay in
project housing subject to whatever conditions

the commissioners chose to designate. We found
no evidence that Samoans fared worse than non-

Samoans on appeal (in fact they did better, although the coefficient was not significant), but
the more the money owed, the worse the Samo-

ans did as compared to other tenants. However,
the small numbers of cases and the likelihood of

selection effects preclude any clear interpretation
of these findings.
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nonpayment case we observed was nothing
special:
This wasn't a very good case for you. .. it was

one of our real rinky dink cases. We didn't
have the Samoans, we didn't have the shout-

ing, we didn't have the language barrier, we
didn't have any witnesses....

more likely to hold against Samoans in close
cases. But recall that we found only weak
evidence of discrimination against Samoans
in cases brought for nonfinancial reasons.10
If a generalized prejudice against Samoans
were the main reason they fared worse than

tenants from other ethnic groups in financial
cases, we should have found that the effect

A tenant board member, when asked

was just as strong or-given the reputation

whether her children (whom she admitted

of Samoans for violence-stronger in cases

sometimes stayed overnight as unauthorized

involving fighting, trouble-making, and
other nonfinancial offenses. Moreover, in our

guests) might get her into trouble if they
were involved in a fight, replied:
Oh yeah, but in a project like [mine], you
know, we are pretty lucky. There are not too

interviews, board members and others were
more likely to comment on the special situation of Samoans than they were to make re-

marks suggesting generalized prejudice. For

many [fights]. We don't have many Samoans
for one thing. ...

example, a former board chairperson, when

And, a longtime project manager, admired

of rent cases, said about Samoans and other

by tenants for his care and understanding,

acknowledged the stereotype:
Even I will say, "Ooo, that's a wild one," or
"he's a Samoan," but really I had Japanese who
were just as ornery in talking to me; yeah, like
any other strains. You know, it is funny, as I

recollect, prejudice is, I think, a matter of perception or you see ... maybe a Black guy who
gets hostile and there is [nothing] there, but if
[you see] that, then I guess it exists.

The attitudes reflected in these remarks
might suggest that managers and prosecutors
push harder for eviction when Samoans are
defendants,9 and that board members are
9 The project manager's preference can influence the HHA eviction board. In the nonpayment
cases we observed, the project manager was invariably asked whether, apart from the charged
lease violation, the tenant caused any problems.
Project managers bringing cases to the HHA for
financial reasons could be more likely to accuse
Samoan than non-Samoan tenants of causing
other problems on the project, either because Samoan tenants are in fact more likely to have
caused other problems or because the managers
perceptions are biased. Our data do not, however,
suggest that Samoans charged with nonpayment
of rent are evicted for reasons other than their

asked about her stance toward nonpayment
Micronesians:
I felt there were cultural and language barriers
often. I think some people used them as ex-

cuses, but I think in a lot of cases people were
not used to the kinds of system that they
needed to respond to in order to remain in public housing. ... And that didn't mean that the
Authority did not have the right to collect their
rent, but it became real difficult for the board
to often make that decision [to evict], because
I honestly don't think that the person who was
responsible [for] that rent understood the expectations from their cultural context.

A former board member, when asked
whether any special accommodations were

10 We do not believe that selection bias obscures discrimination that may exist. For this to
occur Samoans tried for these charges would have
to have committed offenses that were less serious

than those committed by non-Samoans in ways
we could not measure. This seems unlikely. Many
cases brought for nonfinancial reasons are triggered by tenant complaints, and the HHA is reluctant to prosecute cases involving trouble on

the projects unless complainants are willing to
testify. Managers report that because tenants feel
intimidated by Samoans, they are reluctant to register official complaints or to testify against them.
This might explain why Samoans, despite their
reputation, are disproportionately less likely to be
tried for nonfinancial reasons. It also suggests

nonpayment. If the nonpayment charge was a
subterfuge for evicting tenants for other harderthat when Samoans are tried for these reasons
to-prove reasons, we would expect Samoans to be
their cases are, if anything, likely to be more,
particularly disadvantaged in cases where small
rather than less, serious relative to the cases of
sums of rent were owed, but the interaction we
found between rent owed and ethnicity runs in the non-Samoans, for only when matters are serious
are neighbors likely to complain.
opposite direction.
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made for Samoans who had, in their own

tural logics of Samoan tenants and eviction

minds, good reasons for spending rent

board members: What seemed natural or appropriate to Samoans did not seem natural or

money on something other than their rent
(e.g., contributing to a funeral in Samoa),

appropriate to board members. In judging

commented:

Samoans like anybody else, in failing to take
for granted what Samoan tenants took for

I think all of us had an empathy, and perhaps
even a sympathy, for these folks [Samoans],
because we realized that we always had to stop
and think, well maybe they really don't understand. We always had to appreciate the cultural
difference, and I think all of us took that into
consideration. However, we tried to end up
judging them the same way we would anybody
else.

granted, the board produced a pattern of decisions similar to the pattern that might have
resulted if Samoan ethnicity were intentionally treated as a factor weighing in favor of
eviction. Our interviews and our knowledge

of Samoan culture convince us that this pattern is primarily due to the unique ways Samoans were prone to excuse rent payment

lapses. 1'
These views were echoed, though not so
eloquently, by a former board chairperson
who, when asked how the board reacted to

The Quality of Excuses

Samoans whose rent had been diverted in cul-

The excuses most housing tenants give for

turally approved ways, said that the board
members "took that into consideration," but

skipping rent payments usually refer to fac-

added:
[The Samoan tenants] do have certain respon-

sibilities here. . . . They helped their cultural
situation out, and now it is time for their cultural situation to help them.

tors beyond their control, such as illness, un-

employment, thefts of wallets, and the like.
The excuses Samoans offer, however, often
refer to sending money to relatives for weddings and funerals, traveling to Samoa for
these same purposes, and giving money to
their church. To Westerners, these kinds of

expenditures seem to be within a person's
CULTURAL DISCRIMINATION

The three board members we have quoted,

and others as well, all realized that Samoans

faced substantial pressure to spend rent
money to meet their cultural obligations.
They had, in different degrees, sympathy for

the Samoans' plight and saw their fellow
board members as similarly understanding.
However, ultimately all of them, with varying degrees of reluctance, concluded that if
Samoans could not pay the rent by drawing
on their "cultural situation" or in some other
way, the board had to evict them.
If, as one board member said, the board
ended up "judging [Samoans] the same way

[it] would anybody else," the board did not
discriminate within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
since this requires differential treatment on
the basis of a protected characteristic, such
as race. Yet if Samoans were not selected for
harsh treatment because of their race, how
can one explain the disadvantage that at-

control; but to Samoans they may seem ev-

ery bit as compelling as the need to pay doctors' bills.
I I A secondary factor is that Samoans, even high
chiefs, are used to having a class of people called
orators speak for them on formal occasions. Some
Samoans spoke to the board through such third
parties, and more often than not they seemed to
hurt their cases by doing so. One "talking chief'
in particular seemed to alienate the board, for a
number of board members commented on his ineffectiveness. When we examined the files of sev-

eral cases in which he appeared, not only did the

formality of his legalistic arguments appear ludicrous, but in concentrating on pseudo-legal arguments, he neglected to make the kinds of informal

explanations and arguments for leniency that
might have persuaded the board to give his "clients" a second chance. These are arguments
which, ironically, genuine lawyers often make

with some success (Lempert and Monsma 1988;
Monsma and Lempert 1992). The possibility that

representation by orators like this talking chief
hurt Samoans cannot, however, explain most of
the disadvantage that in our quantitative model
seems attributable to Samoan heritage, for there
taches to Samoans in our quantitative model?
are far too few Samoans with such representation
We think the answer lies in the differing cul- to account for the quantitative results.
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Put simply, a good Samoan is a bad public

family support network for its members. In

housing tenant.12 Central in Samoan life are

return, however, Samoans are expected to

the aiga (extended family), the matai (fam-

support their church's needs in much the

ily chief), and, especially in the United

same way as they would support their aiga's

States, the church (Grattan [1948] 1985;

requests. This means that Samoan churches

Holmes 1974; Janes 1990). A Samoan

in the United States are another source of

achieves status through the aiga because Sa-

culturally-reinforced demands for funds.13

moans share in the status of their aigas and

Facing such strong cultural pressures, Samo-

because, in the case of males, the aiga

ans may give rent money to the aiga or

chooses its own chiefs. As head of the family, the matai controls the family's property
and allocates the family's wealth. While the
degree of matai control over property has
broken down in recent years as a cash
economy has largely replaced the propertybased subsistence economy in Samoa, a con-

church. Board members treat rent payments

comitant aspect of this change is that Samo-

gitimate excuses for not paying the rent. Re-

ans are expected to make cash contributions
to their matai and aiga. Indeed, Samoan

call the sympathetic board member quoted
above. His bottom line was that, "We tried to

families often fund their relatives' emigration as an investment, with the return to the

end up judging [Samoans] the same way we
would anybody else." Another board mem-

family taking the form of regular "remittances" once the relatives have gotten jobs
(Ali'Ilima and Stover 1986). It is particularly
important that cash gifts be sent in connection with certain ceremonial occasions, especially funerals and weddings (Ablon 1971).
Not doing so dishonors both the individual

ber, who clearly recognized the cultural rea-

(making it unlikely he will ever achieve
chiefly status) and, if the family cannot make

up the shortfall, the aiga. It may also mean

as a primary obligation and can be particu-

larly resentful if, as is often the case, the
tenant's primary source of income comes
from welfare. Thus, while board members
may recognize the special pressures that Samoans face, most do not regard them as le-

sons for certain Samoan behavior patterns,
similarly concluded:
I think that many of the cultural things that
have held up and have proven good in island

countries cannot withstand the city.... [M]y
feeling is . . . that if they come to this urban
situation, nobody is forcing them, and they
come to it; they must adjust to it. I am willing
to take into consideration that [cultural reasons

that in a crisis situation the individual cannot
count on the aiga for support.

Samoans in the United States often have
relatives living near them, so the aiga can in
part be reconstituted in this country. However, even when there are numbers of relatives in the United States, the larger part of
the aiga and its matai are likely to live in
Samoa. In these circumstances the church

fills the gap and provides a general trans-

13 There are other aspects of Samoan culture
that make good Samoans poor housing tenants.
The tremendous stress on the family and a pattern of emigration in which Samoans arrive in the
United States expecting to spend months, if not
years, living with relatives means that Samoans
in public housing face special pressures to break

guest rules and to overcrowd housing units.
Strong family ties also make it difficult for a Samoan family to exclude a trouble-making relative

from its household, even if the relative's contin-

12 Most Samoan immigrants to the United

ued presence or visits may trigger an eviction ac-

States, including most Samoan public housing

tion. Moreover, Samoans accept occasional vio-

tenants, come from American Samoa. The portrait
that follows is truer today of western Samoa than

lent outbursts in men as natural, and they raise
their children with physical discipline so severe

it is of American Samoa, where traditions have

that some Westerners would see it as child abuse

more rapidly broken down. Studies of Samoans

(Baker 1986; Lazar 1985). These features of Sa-

in the United States during the past 20 years indicate, however, that elements of the traditional
culture persist, and these cultural remnants would
have been more deeply rooted in the head of
household generations at the time our cases arose

moan culture, together with the sheer physical
ans are often stereotyped as violent and are feared

than they are today in younger, American-born

cases, even if they may affect the stereotypes held

generations.

by managers and board members.

size of many Samoans, may explain why Samoin Hawaiian housing projects. These aspects of

Samoan culture do not figure directly in financial
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explain lease violations], but there comes a
place where I think that they must adjust, and
the two cultural patterns do not.

were that a wallet had been stolen or that a
child had fallen ill,'6 this board member, despite some skepticism, would have credited
the reason.

Another board member was less able to

Consider the following example of an ex-

empathize. She commented that as a board

cuse that worked for a tenant who at the time

member she had learned over time to be less

of the hearing owed $345.00 in rent. It was

sympathetic to tenants, and when asked how

recorded in the summer of 1987, when the

she had learned to overlook the "sob stories,"

board had become quite strict, and virtually

she made it clear that for her, even the ex-

no excuses were effective.

cuses got stale:

Prosecutor:

Oh, well, from experience I guess. There are
so many of them that come on and say, espe-

How come you got behind in this?

cially the Samoans; I mean they always say that
they cannot pay their rent because they have to
support the church and things like that. But after you get 10, 15 of them telling you the same

Tenant:

things....

cause he is not my real son. It is her son, and I
cannot get him under my medical until we sign

[Or funerals or things like that?]
Yea, or they gotta go home; they gotta go back

to Samoa because somebody is sick over there

or things like that. But you know, when you

come down to it, they are all on welfare, and
they are using your money too-so you learn
to become a little bit more, you know, you
don't believe all the things that they tell you.

Well, as I told them when they called that my
boy had fell in the river and almost cut off his
finger and I don't have medical for him be-

more papers or get a lawyer to say he is going
to be my son. So, I had to pay cash in order to

get it done. They wouldn't let him go under my
medical, and therefore the stitches and every-

thing costs about $243.00 or something like
that, and we were short already on the money.

The tenant then explained why, after three
months, the debt still had not been paid up.

Sometimes, tenants' excuses may be hard
to believe, 14 but the excuses this board mem-

ber mentions are credible within the context

lieve excuses involving events or circumstances

of Samoan culture, even if they are repeated

that they might experience than they are to be-

by tenant after tenant.15 Perhaps if the excuse

lieve excuses they would never make.

16 Samoans are probably less likely than other
tenants to make illness excuses because ordinarily

14 In talking about the reasons Samoans givethey prefer Samoan healers to Western doctors,
for not paying their rent, the HHA's only Samoan

project manager commented:
You know, like I had a tenant who said my uncle so
and so died so I can't pay my rent this month, and I
said, "Which uncle is that?" and I wrote it down. Six
months later the same tenant said his uncle died, and
I said, "Oh, which one is that?" I remembered, and I
said, "Gee, your uncle died twice!" That time you

tell them, "Hey, you pay it by this date or you are
going up [before the eviction board] for it."

and Samoan healers are not expensive (Cook
1983). One example from a medical setting illus-

trates even better than our housing examples how

cultural understandings can clash. Cook (1983)
tells of a Samoan mother who took a very sick
child to a hospital emergency room in Hawaii.
She felt the nurse was scolding her for the child's
state and that her child was handled roughly when
the nurse felt for infected abscesses. So the
mother seized the child from the nurse and ran
away. The hospital called the Honolulu child pro-

15 As with the excuses offered by non-Samo- tective services to try to find the mother. From
ans, it is likely that some of these assertions are
true and that others are simply a Samoan tenant's

idea of what made-up excuse is most likely to be

perceived as a reasonable justification for falling
behind on the rent. In similar fashion, non-Samo-

the mother's point of view her actions were reasonable. Samoans think illness is caused by disharmony in the family or with God, and the
nurse's actions suggested there was a disharmony
between her and the mother, which further threat-

ans tenants as a group report too many thefts of

ened the child's health. From the nurse's point of

wallets or purses for all the stories of such losses

view, the mother's delay in seeking medical treat-

to be true. It is difficult, if not impossible, however, to sort out true from false. In these circumstances board members seem more likely to be-

ment (because she had gone to a healer) was child
neglect, and when the mother ran away the authorities had to be alerted.
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Yeah, well that put us behind already right
there, because rent was due, but then his finger

further and argued that the only way that

was also due too. We had to save his finger,

housing tenants was if particularly Samoan

right? And then the following month when I
got paid I had to cash my check, and I was in
Waikiki, and I had to go to work. So when I
had gotten to work and put all my things in my
locker and locked it, somebody had broken into
my locker and stole my money out of my

locker. So, right there we were hurting for the
whole month. I told them I would catch it up as
soon as my next two pay checks, because I only

get paid every two weeks. So there was no
money or no way that I could get any money to
pay it until I get paid.

Significantly, the chairperson began the

Samoans could learn how to be "good"
excuses were not tolerated. As one project
manager said:
We have a lot of Samoans at this project, and

there is a Samoan custom that every time somebody dies, you give money to the family to help
bring the family over from Samoa. I have the
hardest time trying to change that custom, but
little by little. [I tell them] you pay your rent
first, then you help the family.

If this manager succeeds, he will be making his Samoans better public housing ten-

board's private deliberations by saying that

ants, but worse Samoans. Ironically, he

he believed the man's story with respect to

might also be depriving them of their ability

both the injured finger and the stolen money.

to call upon church and family when, for

An attitude similar to the one that moti-

good Western (or Samoan) reasons, the fam-

vated the board in this case is revealed in the

ily falls behind on rent and needs a lump sum

remarks of a former chairperson who served

to clear its debt. Managers and board mem-

on the board at a time when tenants more of-

bers report that once the crisis of eviction is

ten avoided eviction. This chairperson con-

real to them, Samoans are often able to ac-

trasted situations in which the board was

quire money from church or kinfolk to clear

sympathetic and unsympathetic:

their debts. Samoans who have not contrib-

[Y]ou get some who are just welfare people
who spend their money on, you know, other

things. You get some people who are really, the
child was genuinely sick and the money had to
go someplace else and they don't have any
more. We would try to do as much as we possibly could for these particular cases, but sometimes there was nothing we could do.

uted to the church or aiga cannot count on
support from these sources.

Thus, despite some comments suggesting
that some board members and HHA officials
hold stereotypically negative views of Samoans, and despite data showing that, other
measurable variables being equal, Samoans

fare worse than other tenants in eviction
hearings, it is difficult to say whether the

This chairperson recognized the validity of
Samoan excuses within a Samoan's cultural
logic, but rather than do "as much as we possibly could" for these cases, he left what
could be done strictly up to them:
[W]e told [Samoans whose rent money had
gone to meet aiga obligations] that they did
help at one time and they helped someone in a
period of need; now they are in a period of
need....

And we would say, now it is your turn to go to
the coalition in your time of need for them to
help you. And if you can get that, fine. This is
the parameters in which you have to deal.
That's all.

As this chairperson's remarks indicate,

HHA's eviction board discriminates against

Samoans. The difficulty lies not in the

opaqueness of the eviction process, for our
combination of quantitative and qualitative
data offers greater insight into what influences board decisions than studies of discrimination in judicial processes ordinarily
achieve. The difficulty exists because the

Samoan example makes problematic what
we mean by discrimination. There probably

is no "legal" discrimination, for the board
members are arguably responding in the

same way to Samoans as they would to
other tenants who made similar excuses. But

other tenants seldom make similar excuses;

they do not spend money as Samoans do,
and their sense of appropriate excuses is dif-

even a willingness to credit Samoan excuses

ferent.

did not mean they would work. Indeed,
some managers and board members went

Swidler (1986) argues that the influence of
culture lies less in shaping the values toward
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which action is oriented than it does in pro-

judged by its own cultural logic rather than

viding a "tool kit" of habits, styles, and skills
that people can draw on to reach valued ends.

by that of the dominant culture.'8 This is
nicely illustrated by a pair of cases we dis-

The tools that Samoan culture provides are
ill-suited to the end of persuading an eviction board to be lenient. Yet they are suited
to other ends that Samoan tenants value, such
as maintaining status within the aiga. Not
only do Samoan tenants find themselves in a

covered.

In 1981, the HHA sought to evict a 71year-old Samoan high chief, who was a

former head of Hawaii's Samoan Council of
Chiefs, because one of his sons had stabbed
and killed another man on project premises.

dilemma that other tenants need not confront, This gave rise to the most litigated eviction
action in HHA history. The case was eventubut often, because of the taken-for-granted
ally appealed to the Supreme Court of Hanature of many cultural assumptions, they do
waii before it was finally resolved in the
not even recognize the dilemma they are in.
HHA's favor. The tenant had several substanSamoan excuses, real or made-up, do not
tial claims. First, he had not condoned or comove managers or board members who share
a very different taken-for-granted world.17
For these reasons, Samoans are disadvantaged because of their ethnic heritage, just as
surely as they would be if the board were
peopled by bigots who would not give Samoans an even break. The Samoan disadvantage exists because Samoan tenants live
where the rules of another culture dominate,
and they must litigate cases before a board
whose members, even while recognizing the
distinctive features of Samoan culture, share
the assumptions of the dominant culture and
resist those of the dominated one. It is this
form of cultural dominance that might be
called cultural discrimination.

A Final Caution

One must not, however, assume that the adverse outcomes visited on a cultural minority would be avoided if that minority were

operated in his son's behavior and was responsible for it only in that the lease imposed
such responsibility. Second, the chief could
claim he had been a good tenant. The year
before he had been commended by the HHA
and had received an award from the Mayor

of Honolulu for his part in organizing a Samoan patrol to enforce a curfew on project
youth. Third, the chief and his family had,
following Samoan custom, presented them-

selves covered with fine mats in front of the

apartment occupied by the family of the deceased. Eventually they had been welcomed
in by the family, in a traditional act of reconciliation (Filoiali'i and Knowles 1983). Finally, the son who did the killing was in
prison and had no prospect of returning to

the project grounds. Nevertheless, the HHA
insisted on eviction, and the chief and his
family, after losing in the Hawaii Supreme

Court, had to leave the project forever.
Without a similar case involving a non-Sa-

17 One public housing manager was a Samoan moan tenant it is difficult to assess whether
the board was biased. Yet given the chief's

who managed a heavily Samoan project area. He

waited longer to initiate eviction actions than
other housing managers, which probably reflected
his willingness to credit Samoan excuses. He was,
for example, the manager we describe in note 14
who did not start proceedings against a tenant
who said that rent money went to pay for an

uncle's funeral but who did act six months later
when the tenant excused a second payment lapse

by claiming the same uncle had died. Other
project managers would probably not have accepted the first excuse, or had they accepted it,
would not have had the foresight and suspicion to
ask which uncle had died. In another analysis (not
reported) we controlled for cases brought by this

age and status, the forgiving of the chief's
family by the victim's family, and the other
exonerating circumstances, it is easy to as18 For example, when White teachers label
Black students as disruptive more frequently than
they do White students, one might attribute this,
at least in part, to differential cultural understand-

ings and assume that if there were more Black
teachers in the schools, Black students would not
be so frequently labeled as disruptive. Farkas and
his colleagues, however, found that in one large
southwestern school district, Black teachers were

manager and found that his presence could not

substantially more likely than White teachers to

explain the positive coefficient for the Samoan
variable in our probit models.

label Black students as disruptive (Farkas, Grobe,
Sheehan, and Yuan 1990).
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sume that a board more genuinely apprecia-

situation of Samoans and, to some extent,

tive of Samoan culture would have decided

expressed empathy with them. Moreover, the

differently. But let us look to Samoa.

weak and nonsignificant Samoan effect

Less than a decade before, a celebrated and

among those cases not involving financial

somewhat similar case had arisen in the village of Sala'ilua in western Samoa. The adult

debts suggests that any generalized prejudice

son of one of the village's two highest chiefs

for only a small part of the Samoan disad-

shot and killed the other high chief following a quarrel. The son was arrested and taken

vantage.

to jail. It was clear he would be in prison for

vantage seems to be related to how the board

some time. Meanwhile in much the same
fashion as the Hawaiian chief, the heads of
the killer's family presented themselves

evaluated excuses. "Western" excuses like

against Samoans was weak and accounted

Instead a large part of the Samoan disad-

illness were accepted while "Samoan" excuses, like paying for an uncle's funeral,

wrapped in fine mats before the house of the

were not. Does this privileging of culturally

deceased's family. Eventually they were invited into the house in reconciliation. The remaining high chief had known nothing about
his son's intent and could not have prevented
the killing. Later the other chiefs of the village met to decide how the matter ought finally to be resolved. They ordered the chief,
the father of the killer, and all his lineal descendants to leave the village forever (Shore

familiar excuses over culturally unfamiliar

1982).

ones constitute discrimination? From a broad

sociological perspective one can answer yes.
Consider Feagin and Eckberg's (1980) definition of racial or ethnic discrimination-

"the practices and actions of dominant raceethnic groups that have a differential and
negative impact on subordinate race-ethnic
groups" (p. 9). The Samoan disadvantage

seems to fit this definition, except the practices that disadvantage Samoans are not so

CONCLUSION

We began our empirical analysis by noting
that Samoans in Hawaii tend to be disadvantaged and stigmatized relative to other eth-

much those associated with a dominant ethnic group as they are those associated with a
world view and values common across most

assimilated ethnic groups in Western Europe
and North America.

nic groups. Thus we thought they might be

But what follows from defining the Sa-

discriminated against in the housing eviction
process. We first assessed this possibility by
constructing a model that included those
variables available in our data set that the

moan disadvantage as discrimination? Does
it follow that we have identified an immoral

eviction board might, in a legal-normative

practice that should be eliminated? Or is it
reasonable to argue, as more than one board
member did, that rejecting traditional Sa-

moan excuses was fair because by moving to
sense, legitimately consider in its decisionthe United States and accepting welfare submaking processes or that might serve as
sidies Samoans knowingly entered a social
proxies for such variables. We then showed
system that imposed constraints conflicting
that, net of these variables, Samoans were
with their cultural obligations? Moreover,
more likely than tenants of other ethnic backSamoans could learn the ways of the domigrounds to be evicted when charged with finant culture, including how to formulate acnancial violations. Had we stopped here,
which is where most studies of discriminaceptable excuses. Thus, Samoan heritage is
not the inescapable handicap it would be if
tion in legal decision-making stop, we would
the board were dominated by bigots. In these
have concluded that, as expected, Samoan
circumstances should Feagin and Eckberg's
ethnicity triggered discriminatory decisionmaking.
We had other information, however. First,
interviews with HHA eviction board mem-

bers and project managers revealed that al-

though some held unfavorable stereotypes of
Samoans, more often managers and board
members claimed to appreciate the special

definition apply?

We may also ask whether legally remediable discrimination exists. The question is
more complicated than it appears, for the law
applies different tests of discrimination in
different contexts. The most directly relevant
case is McCleskey v Kemp (481 U.S. 279
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[1987]) which examined apparently discrimi-

HHA to show that the board's decisions

natory court decisions. In the McCleskey

were justified by some criterion that bears

case the defendant argued that the Georgia

the same relationship to board decisions that

death penalty statute was administered in a

job-relatedness has to employment deci-

racially discriminatory fashion that violated

sions ( i.e., it reflects the rationale for the

the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments.

test). What is this criterion? One obvious

McClesky presented the Supreme Court with

criterion is a tenant's ability to pay the rent

statistics showing that in cases like his, mur-

owed if eviction is not ordered. By this cri-

derers of White victims were more likely to

terion, Samoan tenants would prevail if the

receive the death penalty than murderers of

HHA could not show that tenants who gave

Black victims. The Court held that the statis-

"Samoan excuses" were worse risks for pay-

tical evidence of discrimination did not help
McClesky, because it could not show that in

ment of rent owed than tenants who gave

his particular case there was an intent to dis-

eviction might be able to mobilize aid from

criminate on the basis of his victim's race. A

church or aiga, they might well be no worse

similar attitude would mean that to show dis-

risks.

crimination by the eviction board, Samoan
tenants would have to show, not that they

the law did not obligate them to give second

other excuses. Because Samoans faced with

The HHA, however, would point out that
chances to all who might succeed and would

faced higher probabilities of eviction because
they were Samoan, but that they were in fact
evicted because they were Samoan rather
than because of the lease provisions they violated. This is an almost impossible task, and
the Court that decided the McCleskey case
knew it.
A second approach is that taken by the Supreme Court in Batson v Kentucky (476 U.S.

court decisions ordinarily rest on past actions

79 [1986]), the case which held that under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a prosecutor could not

even if it applied, would not condemn the

base a peremptory challenge on a juror's
race. This case, too, would be of little help
to a Samoan claiming discrimination, because a Batson claim can be defeated if the
prosecutor is able to give a plausible reason
for challenging a juror. Reasons given for
evicting Samoans are plausible so long as the
board's cultural understandings are shared.

opt for a different criterion. They would ar-

gue that the board's commission-as is any
court's-was to reach just decisions. Just
and excuses more than they focus on likely

future performance. Thus, unless the conception of justice were disassociated from the
evaluation of past behavior and redefined as
accurate prediction, the Griggs standard,

board's action as discriminatory. As far as
justice is concerned, the law ordinarily partakes of dominant cultural understandings. A
change in these understandings, at least

among elite decision-makers, is a prerequisite to legal attacks on cultural discrimination in adjudicative settings.

Yet without changing its understandings,
the HHA's eviction board appears to have

This brings us back to Griggs v Duke
Power, which we called a "high-water

eliminated the "cultural discrimination" we

mark" in the jurisprudence of discrimina-

began, the board had retreated to formalism:

tion. The Griggs test has the potential to
condemn actions that reflect cultural discrimination, because it focuses on outcomes
and makes intentions irrelevant. Nevertheless, even if we put aside the fact that
Griggs was never intended to apply to court
decisions but only to employment matters,
the eviction board's decisions would be unlikely to be condemned. Suppose we regard

The law allowed tenants to be evicted when-

HHA eviction board decisions as analogous

to employment tests. Our data show that Sa-

moans are disproportionately harmed by
these decisions; thus the burden shifts to the

identified. By the time our 1987 fieldwork

ever they were behind in their rent, and the
HHA, after years of trying, had persuaded
the board to adopt the general policy of always evicting when rent was owed at the
time of the hearing, regardless of the reason
(Lempert 1989). Under this policy, Samoans
are not disadvantaged vis-a-vis other tenants
by the quality of their excuses-excuses do
not count. But Samoans may still be disadvantaged in housing if their culture encourages them to give or lend money and consequently to owe rent when other tenants
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would not.19 Formalism, by silencing excuses, renders this disadvantage invisible.

Another aspect of formalism also deserves

according to their own cultural understandings, even when they recognize, and to some
extent respect, the cultural roots of others'

mention. During the time when excuses

actions. We suggest that when one culture's
understandings dominate a decision-making
been different had the board been a formal
arena, conflict with and the subordination of
legal tribunal. A party confronting a formal
other cultures is inevitable, whether or not
tribunal has reason to know that the language
cultural differences are appreciated.
of the tribunal's proceedings is likely to be
We also caution against the too easy equaunfamiliar. Formality is a cue that one should
tion of "disadvantage = discrimination." Had
acquire representatives whose expertise conour data been limited to the kinds of archival
sists of having mastered the language and
information that courts routinely collect and
rules of the tribunal. An informal tribunal prosociologists routinely analyze, we would
vides no such cues, for it purports to speak
have felt comfortable in concluding that Saand hear the language of the parties before it.
moans are more likely to be evicted than
For most HHA tenants this was a fair represimilarly situated non-Samoans, and we
sentation, but for Samoans different cultural
would have plausibly attributed this to ethassumptions meant that the board's informalnic prejudice. Our interview data called into
ity was to some extent an illusion. A more
question this explanation for the Samoan disformal scheme, with provision for legal repadvantage and suggested that a richer causal
resentation, would-if it did not bring
process lay behind it; one which, as we have
with it an aggregate disadvantage for all tenseen, makes problematic the very label "disants-have served Samoans better.
crimination." This is not to say that cultural
We are not the first to note disadvantages
discrimination is a misnomer, but in more
that people can suffer when judged by memways than one discrimination is a matter of
bers of another culture. But the concern of
perspective. To perceive this is to realize that
most prior researchers, particularly those fothe definition of discrimination is an object
cusing on education, has been on situations
of political struggle. Ultimately, it is power
where decision-makers do not realize the culthat will determine whether cultural distural roots of their taken-for-granted assump- crimination becomes a legal as well as a sotions and thus misinterpret another's behavciological concept.
ior. Indeed, some of this literature seems to
RICHARD LEMPERT is the Francis A. Allen Collecarry the optimistic implication that, given
giate Professor of Law and Professor of Sociolpeople of good will, if cultural assumptions
ogy at the University of Michigan. He is Chairwere obvious, problems of biased decisionElect of the Department of Sociology at the Unimaking would disappear. Our research indicounted, the situation we describe might have

versity of Michigan and of the ASA's section on
the Sociology of Law. Currently he is a Fellow at
the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
19 Conversely they may be advantaged if when
Sciences. His recent research has involved DNA
they fall behind in their rent-they can call on
evidence, the jury system, and various aspects of
their church or aiga for financial assistance.
the HHA's public housing eviction process. CurWhether Samoans as a group are in fact disadrently he is working on books on evidence law
vantaged vis-a'-vis other tenants depends on the
and public housing evictions. He is coauthor
balance between the resources that Samoans give
(with Joseph Sanders) of An Invitation to Law
to the aiga and church and those they receive
and Social Science (University of Pennsylvania
when threatened with eviction. In turn, this balPress, 1986).
ance depends on the HHA's institutional arrangeKARL MONSMA is Assistant Professor of Sociology
ments. The increasing speed with which the HHA
processed evictions in the most recent years we
at Northwestern University. He recently comstudied may have made it difficult for Samoan
pleted his dissertation on local causes of conflict
between economic and political elites in post-cotenants to receive support that would have been
available given more time. This increased effilonial Argentina. He is studying the negotiation
ciency may account for the fact that the "Samoan
and enforcement of exchange agreements bedisadvantage" appears to increase over time,.even tween ranchers and both free and enslaved workas, toward the end of the last period studied, exers in relatively lawless frontier areas of nineteenth-century Argentina and Brazil.
cuses of all sorts were unlikely to be heeded.

cates that decision-makers may decide cases
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